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This study incorporates international firm mobility into a new 
open economy macroeconomic model to analyze the question of how 
allowing for the international relocation of firms affects the impact 
of government spending shock on consumption and exchange rate. 
The study shows that the government spending shock of a home 
country results in a proportionate decrease in the relative home 
consumption level and a depreciation of the home currency. In 
addition, depreciation increases (decreases) the relative real profits 
of firms located in the home country (abroad), and consequently, 
firms relocate to the home country. The study also shows that 
an increase in the degree of firm mobility weakens the effects of 
government spending shocks on relative consumption and exchange 
rate.
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I. Introduction
The international spillovers of fiscal policies have been studied ex-
tensively in new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) literature, 
e.g., the works of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996), Betts and Devereux 
(2000), Caselli (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Cavallo and Ghironi 
(2002), Chu (2005), Ganelli (2003, 2005a, 2005b), and Di Giorgio et al. 
(2015).1 The literature has focused on how the macroeconomic activity 
of each country and the exchange rate are influenced by unanticipated 
fiscal shocks under monopolistic distortions and sticky nominal prices.
Since the publication of the work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), most 
NOEM models have assumed that firms are immobile across countries, 
and they have shown that changes in foreign output following domestic 
government spending shocks are the main sources of the international 
transmission effect. Although the effects of government spending 
shocks can be explored feasibly as a framework, recent empirical ev-
idence (e.g., Cushman 1985 and 1988; Froot and Stein 1991; Campa 
1993; Klein and Rosengren 1994; Goldberg and Kolstad 1995; Blonigen 
1997; Goldberg and Klein 1998; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2001; Chakrabarti 
and Scholnick 2002; Farrell et al. 2004; Miyagawa et al. 2004) suggests 
that exchange rates affect the production locations and foreign direct 
investments of firms. In addition, the entry regulations that govern mul-
tinational firms in developed and newly emerging countries have be-
come substantially liberalized in recent years. As a result, multinational 
firms from the US, Japan, South Korea, and China have extensively 
and actively invested across national borders. 
In the NOEM literature, the studies on the topic at hand (i.e., how 
allowing for the international relocation of firms affects the impact of 
government spending shocks on consumption and exchange rates) 
are limited. One exception is the work of Johdo (2015), which pres-
ents a NOEM model with international relocation of firms. Johdo 
(2015) contrasts the standard NOEM model with the NOEM model 
with international relocation and subsequently succeeds in showing 
explicitly the effects of a country’s monetary expansion on both relative 
1 Other related references include Senay (1998), Lombardo and Sutherland 
(2004), Pierdzioch (2004), Choi (2005), Ganelli and Tervala (2010) and Di Giorgio 
et al. (2018). For surveys of the NOEM literature examining fiscal policy issues, 
see Lane and Ganelli (2003) and Coutinho (2005).
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consumption level and exchange rate in a world where firms can re-
locate across countries. However, the literature does not consider the 
impact of government spending shock on international relocation 
of firms and other macroeconomic variables, including relative 
consumption level and exchange rate.
In this study, we extend the model of Johdo (2015) to include govern-
ment consumption spending. A novel feature of our model is that the 
international relocation of firms responds to exchange rate movements 
caused by government spending shocks.
We conclude that government spending shock in a home country 
leads to a proportionate decrease in relative home consumption, and the 
home currency depreciates correspondingly. In addition, depreciation 
increases (decreases) the relative real profits of firms located in the 
home country (abroad), and consequently, firms relocate to the home 
country. Moreover, an increase in the degree of firm mobility weakens 
the effect of government spending shocks on relative home consumption 
and exchange rate.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, 
we outline the features of the dynamic optimizing model. In Section 
III, we present symmetric equilibrium with flexible nominal wages. In 
Section IV, we define a log-linearized version of the model. In Section V, 
we examine how an unanticipated government spending shock affects 
relative home consumption, exchange rate, and international allocation 
of firms. The final section summarizes the findings.
II. Model
We assume a two-country (home country and foreign country) world 
economy. The models for the home and foreign countries are the 
same, and an asterisk is used to denote foreign variables. The markets 
for goods and labor have a monopolistic competition, whereas the 
markets for money and international bonds are perfectly competitive. 
Monopolistically competitive firms exist continuously in the world in 
the [0, 1] range, and therefore, the total number of firms is fixed. Each 
firm uses local labor as an input and produces a single differentiated 
product. Each product is freely traded, and firms earn positive pure 
profits. Firms are mobile internationally, but their owners are not. Pro-
ducers in the interval [0, nt] locate in the home country in period t, and 
the remaining (nt, 1] producers locate in the foreign country, where nt is 
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endogenous. The size of the world population is normalized to unity. We 
assume that households inhabit the interval [0, s] in the home country 
and households inhabit the interval (s, 1] in the foreign country.
Home and foreign households share the same utility function. The 
intertemporal objective of household i ∈ (0, s) in the home country at 
time t is used to maximize the following lifetime utility:





t iU E logC log M P kττ τ τ ττχβ
∞ −
= −∑= +   (1)
where Et represents the mathematical expectation conditional on 
the information set made available to household i in period t; β is a 
constant subjective discount factor (0 < β < 1); si
τ
 is the amount of 
labor supplied by household i in period t; and the consumption index 
i
tC  is defined as θ θ θ θ− −= ∫1 ( 1)/ /( 1)0( ( ) ) ,
i i
t tC C j dj  where θ (> 1) is the elasticity 
of substitution between any two differentiated goods, and ( )itC j  is the 
consumption of good j in period t for household i. The second term 
in (1) represents real money balances ( / )t
i
tM P , where 
i
tM  denotes 
nominal money balances held at the beginning of period t + 1, and Pt 
is the home country’s consumption price index (CPI), which is defined 
as 1 1 1/(1 )0( ( ) ) ,t tP P j dj
θ θ− −= ∫  where ( )tP j  is the home-currency price of 
good j in period t. Analogously, the foreign country’s CPI is defined 
as 1 1 1/(1 )0( ( ) ) ,t tP P j dj
θ θ∗ ∗ − −= ∫  where Pt
*(j) is the foreign-currency price 
of good j in period t. Under the law of one price, we can rewrite the 
corresponding price indexes to 1 1 1 1/(1 )0( ( ) ( ( )) )t t
n
t t n t tP P j dj P j dj
θ θ θε− ∗ − −= ∫ + ∫  
and 1 1 1 1/(1 )0( ( )/ ) ( )) )t t
n
t t t n tP P j dj P j dj
θ θ θε∗ − ∗ − −= ∫ + ∫ . By ignoring the trade 
costs between the two countries, the law of one price holds for any 
variety j; i.e., Pt(j) = εt ( )tP j , where εt is the nominal exchange rate, which 
is defined as the home-currency price per unit of foreign currency. 
Given the law of one price, a comparison of the above price indexes 
implies that purchasing power parity (PPP) can be represented by 
t t tP Pε
∗= . In this context, we assume for an international risk-free real 
bond market, in which both home and foreign representative house-
holds can lend and borrow at the same interest rate, and real bonds 
are denominated in the units of the composite consumption good. At 
each point in time, households receive returns on risk-free real bonds, 
earn wage income by supplying labor, and receive profits from all firms 
equally. Therefore, the household budget constraint can be written as 
follows:






( ( ) ( ) ) ,t
t
i i i i i si
t t t t t t t t t
n i i
t n t t t t t t
P B M P r B M W
j dj j dj P C Pε τ
+ −
∗
+ = + + +






tB +  denotes real bonds held by home agent i in period t + 1; rt 
denotes the real interest rate on bonds that applies between periods 
t − 1 and t; i sit tW   is nominal labor income, where 
i si
t tW  denotes the 
nominal wage rate of household i in period t; 10 ( ) ( ( ) )t t
n
t n t tj dj j djε
∗∫ ∏ ∫ ∏  
represents the total nominal profit flows of firms located at home 
(abroad) from sales of products; it tP C  represents nominal consump-
tion expenditure; and itτ  denotes real lump-sum taxes. All variables 
in (2) are measured in per capita terms. In the government sector, we 
assume that government spending is purely dissipative and financed 
by lump-sum taxes and seigniorage revenues derived from printing 
the national currency. Hence, the government budget constraint in the 
home country is sGt = τt + [(Mt − Mt−1)/Pt], where sGt denotes aggregate 
government spending, Mt is aggregate money supply, and τ τ= ∫ 0
s i
t tdi .
In the home country, firm j ∈ [0, nt] locally hires a continuum 
of differentiated labor inputs and produces a unique product in 
a single location according to the CES production function of 
φ φ φ φ φ− − −= ∫ 1/ ( 1)/ /( 1)0( ) ( ) ,
s di
t ty j s di  where yt(j) denotes the production of 
home-located firm j in period t, ( )dit j  is firm j’s input of labor from 
household i in period t, and φ  > 1 is the elasticity of input substitution. 
Given the home firm’s cost minimization problem, firm j’s optimal labor 
demand function for household i’s labor input is expressed as follows:
 1( ) ( / ) ( ),di it t t tj s W W y j
φ− −=  (3) 
where 1 (1 ) 1/(1 )0( )
s i
t tW s W di
φ φ− − −≡ ∫  is a price index for labor input.
We now consider the dynamic optimization problem of households. 
In the first stage, households in the home (foreign) country maximize 
the consumption index ( )i it tC C
∗  subject to a given level of expenditure 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= ∫ = ∫1 10 0( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) )
i i i i
t t t t t t t tP C P j C j dj P C P j C j dj  by optimally allocating 
differentiated goods. This static problem yields the following demand 
functions for good j in the home and foreign countries:
 θ θ− ∗ ∗ ∗ − ∗= =( ) ( ( )/ ) , ( ) ( ( )/ ) .i i i it t t t t t t tC j P j P C C j P j P C  (4) 
In accordance with the NOEM literature, we assume that the 
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consumption index of the government is the same as that of the 
household sector, which is given by ( )i it tC C
∗. Therefore, the demand functions 
of the government for good j in the home and foreign countries are the 
same as those of the household sector. Aggregating the demands in (4) 
across all households worldwide and equating the resulting equation to 
the output of good j produced in the home country, as denoted by yt(j), 
yield the following market-clearing condition for any product j in period t:
 θ∗ ∗ −= + − + + − = +( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,) ( ( ) )/ ( )1 1i i W Wt t t t t t t t ty j sC j s C j sG s G P j P C G  (5)
where  ( )/ ( )/t t t tP j P P j P
∗ ∗=  is f rom the law of  one price, and 
( (1 ) )w i it t tC sC s C
∗≡ + −  and ( (1 ) )wt t tG sG s G
∗≡ + −  are aggregate per 
capita world consumption and government spending, respectively. 
Similarly, for product j  of  foreign-located f irms, we obtain 
θ∗ ∗ ∗ −= +( ) ( ( )/ ) ( )w wt t t t ty j P j P C G . In the second stage, households maximize 
(1) subject to (2). The first-order conditions for this problem with 
respect to 1
i
tB +  and 
i
tM  can be written as β + += + 1 11/ [(1 )/ ]
i i
t t t tC E r C  
and 1 1/ ((1 )/ )
i i
t t t t tM P C i iχ + += + , respectively, where it+1 is the nominal 
interest rate for home-currency loans between periods t and t +1 and 
defined as usual by 1 + it+1 = (1 + rt+1)Et[(Pt+1 / Pt)]. The former formula is 
the Euler equation for consumption, and the latter formula is for the 
money-demand schedule. 
In monopolistic goods markets, each firm has some monopolistic 
power over pricing. Considering that home-located firm j locally 
hires labor, given Wt, Pt, wtC , 
w
tG , and nt, subject to (3) and (5), 
home-located firm j faces the following profit-maximization problem: 
0( )
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )
t
s i di
t t t t t t t tP j
j P j y j W j di P j W y jΠ = − ∫ = − . By substituting 
yt(j) from equation (5) into the firm’s profit Πt(j) and then differentiating 
the resulting equation with respect to Pt(j), we obtain the following price 
mark-up: Pt(j) = (θ/θ − 1))Wt. Moreover, Wt is a given; thus, from the price 
mark-up, all home-located firms charge the same price. Subsequently, 
we define the above identical prices as Pt(j) = Pt(h), j ∈ [0, nt]. The rela-
tionships imply that each home-located firm supplies the same quan-
tity of goods, and hence, each firm requires the same quantity of labor, 
i.e., ( ) ( )id idt tj h=  , j ∈ [0, nt], in which firm index j is omitted because of 
symmetry. The price mark-ups of foreign-located firms are identical be-
cause Pt∗(j) = Pt∗(f), j ∈ (nt, 1]. By substituting (5) and the price mark-ups 
into the real profit flows of home- and foreign-located firms (i.e., Πt(h)/Pt 
and Πt(f)
*/Pt
*, respectively), we obtain












( )/ (1/ )( ( )/ ) ( ),
( ) / (1/ )( ( )/ ) ( ).
w w
t t t t t t
w w
t t t t t t
h P P h P C G
f P P f P C G
 (6)
The model assumes that the driving force of relocation to another coun-
try is the difference in real profits between two countries. Following 
the formulation of Johdo (2015), the above adjustment processes for 
relocation are formulated as follows:
 nt − nt−1 = γ[Πt(h) / Pt − Πt(f )
*/Pt
*] = γ[Πt(h)/Pt − εtΠt(f )
* / Pt], (7)
where the third term can be rewritten by using PPP, and γ (0 ≤ γ < 
∞) is a constant positive parameter used to determine the degree of 
firm mobility between two countries. A larger value of γ implies higher 
firm mobility between two countries. In (7), the adjustment of the 
home country’s share of firms is a linearly increasing function of the 
difference between the real profit of a representative home-located firm 
and the real profit of a representative foreign-located firm. 
As previously explained, in our model, each firm provides one type of 
goods, and a productive activity cannot be simultaneously carried out 
in both countries. In addition, the total number of firms in the world 
is fixed and normalized to unity. Therefore, nt (1 − nt) can be used to 
measure the home (foreign) country’s share of firms. This definition 
implies that an increase in the number of firms located in the home 
country simultaneously decreases the number of firms located in the 
foreign country. Assuming that nt (1 − nt) firms are owned by immobile 
owners living in the home (foreign) country, if a firm moves from a 
foreign country to the home country (i.e., an increase in nt or a decrease 
in (1 − nt)), then firm ownership also moves to the home country. This 
scenario implies that asset redistribution can arise compulsorily across 
two countries by the cross-border relocation of firms. In resolving such 
problem, in accordance with our model, we assume that all firms are 
owned equally by each country’s households. Given this assumption, 
even with the cross-border relocation of firms, the influence of govern-
ment spending shocks can still be considered without taking into ac-
count compulsory asset redistribution.
Following the work of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), we introduce 
nominal rigidities into the model in the form of one-period wage 
contracts. The nominal wages in period t are predetermined at time 
t − 1. In monopolistic labor markets, each household provides a 
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single variety of labor input to a continuum of domestic firms. 
Hence, the equilibrium labor-market conditions for the home and 
foreign countries can be expressed as = ∫ ∈ 0 ( ) , [0, ]t
nsi di
t t j dj i s
 and 
∗ ∗= ∫ ∈ 1 ( ) , [ ,1]
t
si di
t n t j dj i s , respectively. By taking Wt, Pt, yt(j), and nt as 
a given, then by substituting = ∫ 0 ( )t
nsi di
t t j dj  and equation (3) into the 
budget constraint given by (2), and finally by maximizing the lifetime 
utility given by (1) with respect to itW , we obtain the following first-
order condition:
 1 21 1( / ) [ ] ( 1) [( / )]
i si si i
t t t t t t tW P E E Cφ κ φ
−
− −= −   (8)
The equilibrium condition for the integrated international bond market 
is given by 10 1 1 0.
s i i
t s tB di B di
∗
+ +∫ + ∫ =  Money markets are always assumed 
to be clear in both countries. Hence, the equilibrium conditions are 
given by 0
s i
t tM M di= ∫  and 
1 i
t s tM M di
∗ ∗= ∫ . 
III. Symmetric Steady State
In this section, we derive the solution for a symmetric steady state in 
which all endogenous and exogenous variables are constant, the initial 
real bond holdings of the home country are zero (B0 = 0), and G0 = G
*
0 = 
0 and s = s* = 1/2. The superscript i and the index j are omitted because 
households and firms make the same equilibrium choices within and 
between countries. Then, we denote the steady-state values by using the 
subscript ss. In the symmetric steady state, given the Euler equation for 
consumption, the steady-state real interest rate is given by rss = (1 − β / 
β ≡ δ, where δ is the rate of time preference. The steady-state allocation 
of firms is nss = 1/2. Hence, from (8), we obtain
1/2 1/2 1/2( ) ( ) (( 1)/ ) (( 1) ) (1/ ) .s s wss ss ss ss ss ss ssC C C y h y f φ φ θ θ κ
∗ ∗ ∗= = = = = = = − −   (9)
Substituting wssC  from equation (9) into equation (6) yields the steady-
state levels of real profit for home- and foreign-located firms, which 
have equal values.
1/2 1/2 1/2( )/ ( ) / (1/ )(( 1)/ ) (( 1)/ ) (1/ )ss ss ss ssh P f P θ φ φ θ θ κ
∗ ∗Π = Π = − −  (10)
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IV. Log Linearization around the Steady State
The macroeconomic effects of unanticipated permanent government 
spending shocks need to be examined. Thus, we solve a log-linear 
approximation of the system around the initial zero-shock steady state 
with Bss, 0 = 0, as described in the previous section. Following the work 
of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996), for any variable X, we use Χ̂  to 
denote “short run” percentage deviations from the initial steady-state 
value, i.e., 1 ,0ˆ / ssdX XΧ = , where Xss, 0 is the initial zero-shock steady-
state value, and the subscript 1 denotes the period in which the shock 
has occurred. These short-run percentage deviations are consistent 
with the length of nominal wage contracts. Thus, nominal wages and 
prices of goods can be determined as ˆ ( ) ( ) 0W W P h P f∗ ∗= = = =ˆ ˆ ˆ  in the 
short-run log-linearized equations. In addition, we use X  to denote 
“long run” percentage deviations from the initial steady-state value, i.e., 
= =2 ,0 ,0/ /ss ss ssX dX X dX X , which is consistent with flexible nominal 
wages. X2 = Xss because a new steady state is reached at period 2.
V. Government Spending Shocks
We examine how an unanticipated government spending shock 
affects exchange rate, relocation of firms, and cross-country differences 
in consumption. By log-linearizing equation (7) around the symmetric 
steady state and by setting ˆ( ) ( ) 0P h P f∗= =ˆ , we obtain the following log-
linearized expression for the home country’s share of firms2:
 
1/2 3/2 1/21 1 1ˆ ˆ2 .n φ θγ ε
φ θ κ
 − −   =      
      (11)
Equation (11) shows that exchange rate depreciation induces the 
relocation of firms toward the home country.3 Intuitively, with fixed 
2 See Appendix for the derivation of Equation (11).
3 This result is consistent with the evidence found in the literature (e.g., 
Cushman 1988; Caves 1989; Froot and Stein 1991; Campa 1993; Klein and 
Rosengren 1994; Blonigen 1997; Goldberg and Klein 1998; Baek and Okawa 
2001; Bénassy-quéré et al 2001; Chakrabarti and Scholnick 2002; Bolling et al 
2007; Udomkerdmongkol et al 2008) on the relationship between exchange rates 
and foreign direct investments. 
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nominal wages, which cause nominal product prices to be sticky 
because of the mark-up pricing by monopolistic product suppliers, 
depreciation increases relative home production through the 
expenditure-switching effect.4 In turn, this phenomenon increases 
the relative profits of home-located firms, and consequently, other 
firms relocate to the home country to take advantage of high real 
profits. The above equation offers the key to understanding the ef-
fects of unanticipated government spending shocks on cross-country 
differences in consumption. Equation (11) also shows that an increase 
in γ magnifies the effect of exchange rate depreciation on the relocation 
of firms.
We then consider the macroeconomic effects of an unanticipated 
infinitesimal permanent rise in the relative spending level of the home 
government in period ˆ1 : 0,G G G G∗ ∗− = − >ˆ  where ,0ˆ /
w
t ssG dG C≡  and 
1 ,0/
w
t ssG dG C+≡ . The closed-form solutions for the three key variables 
are as follows:
 
Ĉ − ( )1 1ˆ 0,C G GA
δ
δ
∗ ∗+   = − − <   




( )1 1ˆ 0,G GA
δε
δ
∗+   = − >   




1/2 3/2 1/22 1 1 1 1ˆ 0,n G G
A
γ φ θ δ
φ θ κ δ
∗ − − +       = − >        




1 2 1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 3/2 1/2
1 4 [ 4 ] 0, (1 )/ ,
1 4
A θ γφ θ κδ δ θ θ θ γφ θ κ δ δ δ
θ γφ θ κ
−  − += + + + > ≡ + + + 
 





( 1)/θ θ θ≡ − , and ( 1)/ ,φ φ φ≡ −  1/κ κ≡ .5 
4 An expenditure-switching effect arises because exchange rate depreciation 
causes a decline in the relative real price of home goods for consumers in both 
countries, so that world consumption demand switches from foreign goods to 
home goods.
5 ε̂ ε=  holds in money-market equilibrium conditions, and Ĉ − Ĉ C C∗ ∗= −  
holds for Euler consumption equations. Thus, the short-run equilibrium also 
holds in the long run.
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Equation (12) indicates that an unanticipated rise in domestic 
government spending leads to a proportionate decrease in relative 
home consumption level. The result in (12) can be explained intuitively 
as follows. First, with a given exchange rate, a rise in domestic 
government spending instantaneously leads to the crowding-out of 
home consumption because the rise in the home country’s government 
spending does not increase the home output needed to sufficiently 
offset the rise in lump-sum taxes. Hereafter, we call this phenomenon 
the “wealth effect.” Consequently, the decrease in home consumption 
leads to exchange rate depreciation. This scenario can be attributed 
to the demand for real money balances, which increases with 
consumption (as implied by the money-demand function), and the 
home currency must depreciate and reduce the supply of real money 
balances in the home country to restore money market equilibrium. 
In turn, exchange rate depreciation causes a consumption switching 
because the world consumption demand shifts toward the home goods 
given the fall in the relative price of home goods. This phenomenon 
causes firms located abroad to move to the home country because of 
the increase in the relative profits of firms located in the home country 
(i.e., equation (11)). The relocation raises the relative labor income in 
the home country accordingly, and this rise in income also increases 
the relative consumption level in the home country.6 Hereafter, we 
call this phenomenon the “substitution effect.” Consequently, the net 
effect on relative home consumption depends on the relative strengths 
of the wealth effect and the substitution effect. However, on the basis 
of equation (12), the negative wealth effect dominates the positive 
substitution effect, and therefore, a rise in government spending leads 
to a decrease in relative home consumption.
As for the changes in exchange rate, equation (13) indicates that a rise 
in unanticipated domestic government spending leads to a depreciation 
of the exchange rate. The exchange rate effect is determined by two 
conflicting mechanisms. On the one hand, as stated above, the rise in 
unanticipated government spending in the home country requires an 
instantaneous depreciation of its currency because of the fall in rela-
tive home consumption through the wealth effect. On the other hand, 
6 In our model, home currency depreciation leads to a redistribution of world 
labor income in favor of the home country through the international relocation 
of firms.
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the rise in government spending reduces the real price of home goods 
relative to foreign goods because of the initial depreciation of the home 
currency, and this scenario causes the world demand to switch toward 
home goods. In turn, the demand shift increases the relative profits 
of home-located firms, and this phenomenon causes foreign firms to 
relocate to the home country. As a result, the relocation raises the 
relative labor income in the home country, and the short-run relative 
home consumption is also raised. Owing to the latter mechanism, the 
home currency must appreciate to restore market equilibrium in favor 
of real balances. Thus, the impact of the rise in government spending 
in the home country on the equilibrium exchange rate is ambiguous. 
However, on the basis of equation (13), the former scenario dominates 
the latter scenario, and therefore, a rise in government spending leads 
to a depreciation of the home currency. 
Equation (12) also shows that an increase in γ weakens the 
decreasing effects of government spending shock on the relative home 
consumption level. Intuitively, as the relocation of firms becomes 
much more flexible (as γ increases), a greater relative increase in home 
labor income is achieved because more firms relocate to the home 
country, and therefore, the positive substitution effect is greater.7 Thus, 
an increase in γ weakens the reduction in short-run relative home 
consumption through the larger substitution effect. In addition, an 
increase in γ weakens the effect of government spending shock on ex-
change rate depreciation. This scenario can be explained by the impact 
of government spending shock on exchange rate, in which the impact 
depends on the scale of response of relative home consumption toward 
the same shock.
The primary focus of this study is to determine how the international 
relocation of firms affects the impact on cross-country differences in 
consumption and the exchange rate of fiscal policy shocks, particularly 
by comparing our analysis with the predictions of previous studies 
that ignored the relocation of firms. The central difference between 
our main findings and those of the previous studies are as follows. In 
the previous studies, given the assumption of fixed allocation of firms, 
the home government’s expenditure falls on both domestic and foreign 
7 Equation (14) shows that an increase in γ magnifies the response of the 
relocation of firms into a government spending shock.
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goods, while the taxes that finance the expenditure are borne entirely 
by home-located households. Hence, in the previous studies, given a set 
of nominal prices or wage rigidities, the increase in production of foreign 
goods is the main source of the international transmission mechanism. 
By contrast, in the present study, by considering the Rudux model of 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), we endogenize the proportion of firms lo-
cated in the home country versus that in the foreign country; these 
two elements in the original model are fixed. A novel feature of our 
model is that the home country’s share of firms responds to exchange 
rate movements caused by government spending shocks. By using the 
model, we find that the rise in unanticipated government spending 
causes home consumption to decrease relative to the foreign consump-
tion, and the exchange rate depreciates when nominal wage rigidities 
prompt foreign firms to relocate to the home country. These scenarios 
imply that the present model generates an added transmission effect 
of the government spending shock on the foreign country through the 
international relocation of firms. This finding has been overlooked by 
the NOEM literature.
VI. Conclusion
In this study, we extend the NOEM model to include international 
relocation of firms. We use a generalized model and consider the ques-
tion of how allowing for the relocation of firms affects the responses of 
relative consumption and exchange rate toward government spending 
shocks. The main findings of our analysis are as follows: i) a home 
country’s government spending shock leads to a proportionate decrease 
in relative home consumption level and depreciation of the home cur-
rency; ii) the depreciation then increases (decreases) the relative real 
profits of firms located in the home country (abroad), and consequently, 
firms relocate to the home country; and iii) an increase in the degree 
of firm mobility weakens the effects of government spending shocks on 
relative consumption and exchange rate. 
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Appendix
A. Long-run equilibrium conditions
The long-run equilibrium conditions of the model are derived. By log-
linearizing the model around the initial zero-shock symmetric steady 
state with Bss,0 = 0, we obtain the following equations to characterize 
the long-run equilibrium of the system:
 , ,P M C P M C∗ ∗ ∗= − = −  (A.1)
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
δ θ θ
θ ε θ∗
= + − − +
 + Π + Π + − − 
( 1)/ ( )
1/2 ( ) ( ) 1/ ,
sC WB h P
h f P G  
(A.2)
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
δ θ θ
θ ε θ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
= − + − − +
 + Π − + Π − − 
( 1)/ ( )
1/2 ( ) ( ) 1/ ,
sC B W f P
h f P G  
(A.3)
 ( )( )θ= − + + ,W WP h CPy G  ( )( )θ ∗∗ ∗= − + + ,W WP f CPy G  (A.4)
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
∗
=








C G C C G G
y y y  
(A.5)
 , ,d dy y
∗∗ ==    (A.6)
 , ,s d s dn n
∗ ∗
= = −+ +     (A.7)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )γ θ φ φ θ θ κ ε∗= − − Π − Π −1/2 1/2 1/22 / 1 / 1 / 1/ ,n h f  (A.8)
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
θ θ
θ θ∗ ∗ ∗










h P h P C
f f C
G
GP P  
(A.9)
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ε
ε
∗ ∗
 = + + 






P Ph f  
(A.10)
 ( ) ( ) ,P h W P f W∗ ∗= =  (A.11)
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 ,P Pε ∗= −  (A.12)
 , ,s sW P C W P C
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= − − = − −   (A.13) 
where 1 ,0/
W
t ssB dB C+≡  and 1 ,0,/
W
t ssG dG C+≡ , in which ,0
W
ssC  is the 
initial value of world consumption. The equations in (A.1) correspond to 
the money-demand equations. Equations (A.2) and (A.3) represent the 
long-run change in incomes (returns on real bonds, real labor incomes, 
and real profit incomes), which are equal to the long-run changes in 
consumption in each country. The equations in (A.4) represent the 
world-demand schedules for home and foreign products. Equation (A.5) 
is the world goods–market equilibrium condition. The equations in (A.6) 
represent the production technology, and those in (A.7) represent the 
long-run labor-market clearing conditions for both countries. Equation 
(A.8) is the dynamic relocation equation. The equations in (A.9) are the 
nominal profit equations for representative home and foreign firms. 
The equations in (A.10) are the price index equations. The equations in 
(A.11) represent the optimal pricing equations for firms in each country. 
Equation (A.12) is the purchasing power parity equation. The equations 
in (A.13) represent the first-order conditions for optimal wage setting.
Subtracting (A.3) from (A.2) yields the long-run (from period t+1 
onward) response of relative per capita consumption levels.
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* * * *2 1 / s sC C W P P GGB Wδ θ θ ∗− = + − − − − + − − −   (A.14)
Substituting (A.9), (A.10), (A.11), and (A.12) into equation (A.8) yields
 
( )( )φ εθγ φ θ κ
 − −   = −   −  
    
1 3 1
2 2 2 *1 1 12 .n W W
 
(A.15)
From equations (A.4), (A.6), (A.7), and (A.11), we obtain 
 ( )* *2 .s s n W Wεθ  − = + − −    (A.16)
From equations (A.12) and (A.13), we obtain
 * * * .s s C C W W ε− + − = − −   (A.17)
From (A.12) and (A.14), we obtain 
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )* * * *2 1 / .s sC W GGC B Wδ θ εθ −= −− + − + − − −   (A.18)
Substituting (A.17) into equation (A.18) yields 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* * * *2 1 / 2 .s sC C B C C GGδ θ θ− = + − − + − − −   (A.19)




 − −     = − − + −           
 
1 3 1
2 2 2 * *1 1 12 .s s C Cn
 
(A.20)









 − −    +           − = − − 
  − −    + +      













Substituting (A.21) into (A.19) yields
φ θθ γ
φ θ κθδ








 − −     − +        −       − +    
     − −    + +      
        













1 1 11 4
12 1
1 1 11 4










    −  
   −          










Equation (A.22) shows that the trade surplus of a home country 
permanently raises home consumption relative to foreign consumption. 
Given (A.1) and (A.12), subtracting the foreign money-demand equation 
from its home counterpart yields
 ( ) .M CCMε ∗ ∗− −= −  (A.23)
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Equation (A.23) states that the long-run change in exchange rate 
depends on the difference between the long-run change in nominal 
money supply and relative change in long-run consumption.
B. Short-run equilibrium conditions
The short-run equilibrium conditions of this model are derived. By 
log-linearizing the model around the initial zero-shock symmetric steady 
state with Bss,0 = 0, we obtain the following equations to characterize 
the short-run equilibrium of the system:
      ,ˆ / 1 / 1 ,C C r C C rδ δ δ δ∗ ∗     ˆ  (A.24)
 
   
   * * ,
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
/ 1 / ,
/ 1 /
M P C r P P
M P C r P P
δ δ
δ δ∗ ∗ ∗
−  −  − −






( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
θ θ θ θ
θ ε
= − − + − +
 + Π + Π + − − − 

*










( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
θ θ θ θ
θ ε
− = − − + − − +
 + Π − + Π − − − 

* *
* * * *
ˆ ˆ
ˆˆˆ ˆ ,
( 1)/ 1 /
1/2 2
dB P n





 * *ˆˆˆ , ,W W W Wy P C G y P C Gθ θ     ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ   (A.28)
 * *ˆˆ , ,d dy y  ̂ˆ  (A.29)
    * *ˆˆˆ , ,W W W Wh P C G f P C Gθ θΠ    Π   ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ  (A.30)
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )γ θ φ φ θ θ κ ε = − − Π − Π − 
1/2 1/2 1/2 *2 / 1 / 1 / 1/ ,ˆˆ ˆn h fˆ (A.31)
 
       









C G C C G G
y y y
 ≡   
  ≡
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ  
(A.32)
    *ˆ ˆ ,1/2 , 1/2P Pε ε  −ˆ ˆ  (A.33)
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 * *ˆ ˆ , ,s d s dn n   −    ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ  (A.34)
where we set nominal wages and prices of goods as    * * 0Ŵ W P h P f   ˆ ˆ ˆ  
( ) ( )* * 0Ŵ W P h P f= = = =  for the above short-run log-linearized equations. The equations 
in (A.24) are the Euler equations. The equations in (A.25) describe equi-
librium in the money markets in the short run. The equations in (A.26) 
and (A.27) are linearized short-run current account equations. The 
equations in (A.28) represent the world-demand schedules for repre-
sentative home and foreign products. Equation (A.29) is the production 
function. The equations in (A.30) are the nominal profit equations for 
representative home and foreign firms. Equation (A.31) is the dynamic 
relocation equation. Equation (A.32) is the world goods–market equilib-
rium condition. Equation (A.33) is the price index equation in the short 
run. The equations in (A.34) represent the short-run labor-market clear-
ing conditions for both countries. Subtracting (A.27) from (A.26) yields
             





1 / 2 1 / 1 /
1 ˆˆ ˆ/
d dB P P n
P P C C G G
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ ε ∗
 − − −  −  − −






Given equations (A.28), (A.29), and (A.33), and by subtracting the foreign 
labor-demand equation from its home counterpart, we obtain
 * * .ˆ ˆ ˆd d y y θε−  −  ̂ ˆ  (A.36)
From (A.36), the change in relative labor demand is proportional to the 
change in relative product demand, and hence, the changes depend on 
consumption switching. Substituting (A.30) and (A.33) into (A.31) yields 
the short-run change in relocation as follows:
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )γ φ φ θ θ κ ε= − −
1/2 3/2 1/22 1 / 1 / 1/ .ˆ ˆn  (A.37)
(A.37) is equivalent to (11). Substituting (A.33), (A.36), and (A.37) into 
(A.35) yields
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
θ θ θ γ φ φ θ θ κ ε = − + − −  
− − − −
2 1/2 1/2 1/2
* *
1 / /2 2 1 / 1 / 1/
ˆ1/2 1/2 .
ˆ
ˆ C GC G
B
ˆ ˆ  
(A.38)
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Given (A.24), and by subtracting the foreign Euler equation from 
its home counterpart, we obtain the following relative per capita 
consumption dynamics:
 * *ˆ .C CC C−  − ˆ  (A.39)
From (A.25), subtracting the foreign money-demand equation from its 
home counterpart yields
  * * .ˆˆ ˆ /ˆM M C Cε ε ε δ− −  − − −ˆ ˆ  (A.40)
Subsequently, we assume that the nominal money supply is held 
constant in both countries in that * * 0.M̂ M M M   ˆ
Derivation of ˆ,ε  *ˆ ,ˆC C−  and n̂
We consider the macroeconomic effects of a one-off unanticipated 
permanent increase in relative home government spending to occur in 
period 1, i.e., the relative home government spending changes according 
to
 * *ˆ .G GG G−  − ˆ  (A.41)
Substituting (A.39), (A.41), and ˆ,ε  from equation (A.40) into equation 
(A.23) yields
  * .ˆˆ C Cε  − − ˆ  (A.42)
A second schedule in ˆ,ε  and *ˆ ,ˆC C−  may be derived by using the 
short-run and long-run current account equations for both countries. 
Substituting equation (A.39) into equation (A.22) yields
φ θθ γ
φ θ κθδ




 − −     − +        −       − = +    
     − −    + +      






















 − −     − +        −       − + −   
     − −    + +      






1 1 11 4
11
1 1 11 4
G G
 
We can combine (A.38), (A.41), (A.42), and (A.43) to solve jointly for ,̂ε   
and *ˆ ˆC C− . From these equations, the exchange rate change is
 
( )* ,ˆ 1 1 0G GA
δε
δ
+   = − >   
     
(A.44)
where
 ( ) ( ) ( )
θ γφ θ κδ δ θ θ θ γφ θ κ
θ γφ θ κ
δ δ δ θ θ θ φ φ φ κ κ
−  − +  = + + +   + + 
≡ + ≡ − ≡ − ≡













1 2 1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 3/2 1/2
1 4 4 ,
1 4
1 / , 1 / , 1 / , 1/ .
A
 
The relative consumption change is
  




   −  − −    




(A.44) and (A.45) are equivalent to (13) and (12), respectively. Finally, 
from (A.37) and (A.44), we obtain
 
( )γ φ θ δ
φ θ κ δ
 − − +       = − >        
        
1/2 3/2 1/2
*2 1 1 1 1 0.ˆ GGn
A  
(A.46)
(A.46) is equivalent to (14).
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